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ILLEGAL PROCEDURES: THE NCAA'S UNLAWFUL
RESTRAINT OF THE STUDENT-ATHLETE
I. INTRODUCTION
During the past ten years, there has been a flood of antitrust litiga-
tion concerning professional sports organizations.1 Acknowledging that
many professional sports organizations have historically restrained trade,
some courts have struck down many long-standing practices of sports
organizations for violating the Sherman Antitrust Act (Sherman Act).2
In the field of athletics, though, the biggest violator of antitrust laws
may not be a professional sports organization; this distinction potentially
belongs to the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA), the
governing body of intercollegiate athletics. Although antitrust litigation
has diminished some of its regulatory power,3 the NCAA still retains
substantial power over its member universities and their athletic
programs.
The NCAA retains its power because of the judiciary's traditional
view of the NCAA and its athletic programs.4 College athletics in the
United States have always been linked to the images of the univer-
sities themselves.5 Under this traditional view, amateur athletics have
been an incidental undertaking, subordinate to the universities' essen-
tial task of providing an education.6 The athlete under this view is
1. See, e.g., Chicago Professional Sports Ltd. Partnership v. NBA, 961 F.2d 667 (7th Cir.
1992); Gilder v. PGA Tour, Inc., 936 F.2d 417 (9th Cir. 1991); USFL v. NFL, 842 F.2d 1335
(2d Cir. 1987); Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990 (1984); North Am. Soccer League v. NFL, 670 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir.
1982); Jackson v. NFL, 802 F. Supp. 226 (D. Minn. 1992); McNeil v. NFL, 790 F. Supp. 871
(D. Minn. 1992); Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., No. 90-1071, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2903
(D.D.C. Mar. 10, 1992); Powell v. NFL, 690 F. Supp. 812 (D. Minn. 1988), rev'd on other
grounds, 888 F.2d 559 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 711 (1991).
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988 & Supp. I 1990); see, e.g., Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593
F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (holding that NFL draft violated rule of reason); McNeil, 790 F.
Supp. at 889 (holding that NFL's Plan B free agent rules may have substantially restrained
competition in relevant market for professional football players' services); Brown, 1992 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 2903, at *34 (holding that NFL violated rule of reason by fixing wages of devel-
opmental squad players during 1989 NFL season).
3. See NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
4. See infra part III.
5. See John C. Weistart, Legal Accountability and the NCAA, 10 J.C. & U.L. 167, 168
(1983).
6. Id.; see also NCAA, 1992-93 NCAA MANUAL 1 (Article 1 (Constitution)) (stating
that purposes of NCAA and intercollegiate athletics are to promote and develop educational
leadership, physical fitness and sports participation as recreational pursuit).
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truly an "amateur," who participates in a sport for the sheer love of the
game.7
In spite of increasing media coverage and increasing commercializa-
tion of college athletics,' the NCAA still clings to the ideal of the "ama-
teur" student-athlete in regulating its members and student-athletes.9 As
a result, the NCAA has been able to evade application of antitrust laws
by hiding behind its stated educational goals.10 In the end, the student-
athlete, the main producer of revenues in intercollegiate athletics, is the
one most adversely affected."
This Comment analyzes a student-athlete's rights under current an-
titrust laws. Part II traces the NCAA's rise from its humble beginnings
to its current status as a monopolistic cartel.1 2 Part III examines the
history of antitrust laws as applied to the NCAA in the market for stu-
dent-athletes and the rationale behind the extensive case law backing the
NCAA.13 Part IV outlines a cause of action that the student-athlete
could bring against the NCAA and argues that the market for student-
athletes, which has traditionally been considered noncommercial, is in
fact commercial. As a result, the rationale that courts have provided in
backing the NCAA has been based on a fallacious, unrealistic concept.14
Part V examines two plans of reform the NCAA could undertake and
concludes that although educational reform would most benefit the stu-
dent-athlete, financial reform is a more likely result. 5
7. See Rick Telander, Something Must Be Done, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Oct. 2, 1989, at
94-95.
8. For example, in 1985 alone, college sports generated more than $1 billion. Mark Ivey,
How Educators are Fighting Big-Money Madness in Athletics, Bus. WK., Oct. 27, 1986, at 136.
In 1989, CBS agreed to pay the NCAA $1 billion over seven years for the broadcast rights to
the men's Division I basketball tournament. Robert N. Davis, Athletic Reform: Missing the
Bases in University Athletics, 20 CAP. U. L. REV. 597, 601 n.23 (1991).
9. Eugene D. Gulland et al., Intercollegiate Athletics and Television Contracts: Beyond
Economic Justifications in Antitrust Analysis of Agreements Among Colleges, 52 FORDHAM L.
REV. 717, 722 (1984); see also NCAA, supra note 6, at 1 (Article 1.3.1 (Constitution)) ("The
competitive athletics programs of the colleges are designed to be a vital part of the educational
system.").
10. See Gary S. Becker, The NCAA: A Cartel in Sheepskin Clothing, Bus. WK., Sept. 14,
1987, at 24; Should College Athletes Be Paid Salaries?, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Dec. 23,
1985, at 56.
11. Should College Athletes Be Paid Salaries?, supra note 10, at 56. This Comment con-
centrates particularly on problems involving football and men's basketball, the main revenue
producers in intercollegiate athletics. See Lee Goldman, Sports and Antitrust: Should College
Students Be Paid to Play?, 65 NOTRE DAME L. Rav. 206; 206 (1990).
12. See infra part II.
13. See infra part III.
14. See infra part IV.
15. See infra part V.
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II. THE HISTORY AND PROBLEMS OF THE NCAA
A. The History of the NCAA
Before the advent of university control of intercollegiate athletics in
the early twentieth century, there was little formal organization of inter-
collegiate athletics, and control was provided by either alumni or stu-
dents.16 While participants tried to formulate rules to protect players,
intercollegiate athletics, particularly football, were still brutally violent.' 7
Furthermore, dishonorable activities were prevalent.1 8 In response to
these problems, sixty-two schools formed the Intercollegiate Athletic As-
sociation of the United States (IAAUS), and institutional control of in-
tercollegiate athletics began. 9 The purpose of the IAAUS was to
organize a set of rules addressing the problems faced by college football;
this formal organization probably saved college football.2" The IAAUS
changed its name to the NCAA in 1910.21
In its present form, the NCAA is an unincorporated association
composed of approximately 960 four-year colleges and universities lo-
cated throughout the United States.22 It is the leading organization in
the field of college athletics.2" The policies of the NCAA are established
by member universities and colleges at annual conventions, and these
policies are implemented by the NCAA Council.2" While individual
member institutions control their own athletic programs, they are bound
16. Note, Tackling Intercollegiate Athletics: An Antitrust Analysis, 87 YALE L.J. 655, 656
(1978). For a more complete history of college athletics during the pre-NCAA period, see
HOWARD SAVAGE, AMERICAN COLLEGE ATHLETICS 13-29 (1929).
17. Frank W. Carsonie, Comment, Educational Values: A Necessity for Reform of Big-
Time Intercollegiate Athletics, 20 CAP. U. L. REV. 661, 666-67 (1991). For example, in 1905,
participation in football directly caused 18 deaths and 149 serious injuries. Id. at 667.
18. For example, hired athletes began to appear on college rosters. Id.
19. Id. University control of intercollegiate athletics began when 38 schools ratified the
IAAUS Constitution in 1906. Note, supra note 16, at 656 n.5.
20. Note, supra note 16, at 656 n.5.
21. Id.
22. Justice v. NCAA, 577 F. Supp. 356, 361 (D. Ariz. 1983). No junior colleges are affili-
ated with the NCAA. MURRAY SPERBER, COLLEGE SPORTS INC. 2 (1990).
23. Organizations other than the NCAA include the National Association of Intercollegi-
ate Athletics (NAIA) and the College Football Association (CFA). See SPERBER, supra note
22, at 247.
24. Justice, 577 F. Supp. at 361. The NCAA Council is a 44-person group that functions
as the NCAA's board of directors. NCAA, supra note 6, at 17 (Article 4.1 (Constitution));
SPERBER, supra note 22, at 309. The NCAA Council has the power to interpret the NCAA
Constitution and its bylaws. NCAA, supra note 6, at 21 (Article 4.2.3 (Constitution)).
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to comply with the NCAA's rules and regulations and are subject to
discipline under these rules.25
Today, the NCAA's stated fundamental purpose is to maintain the
character of amateur intercollegiate athletics as one distinct from the
character of professional athletics. 26 Because the principal difference be-
tween professional and collegiate sports is the payment of salaries to the
athletes, the NCAA's primary purpose is to prevent the commercial in-
fluences of professional sports from destroying the unique product of in-
tercollegiate athletics.27 The NCAA has developed extensive eligibility
rules to maintain the "clear line of demarcation" between professional
and intercollegiate athletics.28
B. Two Conflicting Goals
By enforcing its stated goals, the NCAA acts as a "monitor of the
academic integrity of its members' programs. '29 At the same time, the
25. Kelly W. Bhirdo et al., Comment, McCormack v. National Collegiate Athletic Associ-
ation: College Athletics Sanctions from an Antitrust and Civil Rights Perspective, 15 J.C. &
U.L 459, 459 n.1 (1989); see NCAA, supra note 6, at 8 (Article 3.2 (Constitution)). For
example, each school sets its own annual budget and controls the conduct of its athletics pro-
grams. NCAA, supra note 6, at 7 (Article 3 (Constitution)). The NCAA designates each
member university as a member of Division I, II or III for legislative and competitive pur-
poses. Id at 329 (Article 20.01.2 (Operating Bylaw)). Some universities are allowed to have
certain sports classified in a division other than the division in which it holds membership. Id.
This Comment analyzes problems in Division I institutions, which have the largest athletic
budgets, receive the most television exposure and revenues, and, consequently, abuse the rules
the most. RicHARD E. LAPCHICK & JOHN B. SLAUGHTER, THE RULES OF THE GAME 114
(1989). A Division I school is one that sponsors a minimum of "(a) Six varsity intercollegiate
sports, including at least two team sports... and involving all-male teams or mixed teams of
males and females, and (b) Six varsity intercollegiate sports, including at least two team sports
... and involving all-female teams." NCAA, supra note 6, at 341 (Article 20.9.3 (Operating
Bylaw)).
26. The "Purposes and Fundamental Policy" section of the NCAA Constitution states
that the NCAA eligibility rules exist to maintain amateur intercollegiate athletics "as an inte-
gral part of the educational program and the athlete as an integral part of the student body
and, by so doing, retain a clear line of demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and profes-
sional sports." NCAA, supra note 6, at I (Article 1.3.1 (Constitution)).
27. See id.
28. See id. at 67-202 (Articles 12-16 (Operating Bylaws)). These eligibility rules address
the universities' recruitment of student-athletes, the academic requirements of student-athletes,
and the amount of financial aid and scholarships available to student-athletes. Id. If a univer-
sity or a student-athlete violates an eligibility rule, the NCAA may impose several penalties.
Id. at 323-37 (Article 19.4 (Operating Bylaw)). Some of these penalties are permanent ineligi-
bility of an athlete, forfeiture of contests in which the ineligible athlete participated, and fines
and probation for the school. Id. By maintaining this clear line of demarcation and enforcing
its rules, the NCAA promotes the use of athletics as a tool to further the educational and
social development of students. Id at 1 (Article 1.3.1 (Constitution)).
29. Weistart, supra note 5, at 175.
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NCAA operates as an economic regulator and promoter.3" In this ca-
pacity, the NCAA encourages sports competition among member
schools and attempts to increase the attention the general public gives the
events.31 As an economic promoter, the NCAA has performed ex-
tremely well.32 The problem arises, however, when the NCAA attempts
to reconcile these two goals.
In theory, the NCAA's goal of ensuring that intercollegiate athletics
retain a character distinct from professional sports is admirable: A dis-
tinction between the two levels of sports is proper, because a student-
athlete's main concern should be to gain an education, not to generate
revenue or make money.33 It is also appropriate that persons with an
interest in preserving amateurism assume the task of regulation.34 In
light of promoting education, then, if a regulation affects the academic
integrity of the student-athlete, courts should give a great deal of defer-
ence to the NCAA.35
On the other hand, when the NCAA acts in an entrepreneurial man-
ner, it acts much like a business entity.36 In this situation, courts should
more strictly scrutinize the NCAA's regulations. 37 Although some
NCAA regulation is appropriate,38 stricter scrutiny of these types of
NCAA regulations is justified because such scrutiny prevents the organi-
zation from operating as a cartel.39
30. Id
31. Id
32. For example, in 1987 the NCAA had an operating budget of $57.4 million. Sports,
CHi. TRIB., Jan. 8, 1987, at 8. In 1991, the operating budget was $168.7 million. Constance
Johnson, The Rules of the Game, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 13, 1992, at 60. Member
universities have also fared well; for example, participants in the Final Four of the men's
basketball tournament receive over $1 million. See Goldman, supra note 11, at 206. In foot-
ball, bowl games generate approximately $64 million for participating schools. Dick Rosen-
thal, Crowning a National Champion More Complicated Than It Sounds, USA TODAY, Jan.
21, 1993, at 2C.
33. Weistart, supra note 5, at 175.
34. Id. Regulations that further the goal of preserving the academic perspective include:
defining limits on financial support that can be received by amateur athletes, admission re-
quirements and limitations on the period of eligibility. Id at 175-76.
35. See, eg., Gaines v. NCAA, 746 F. Supp. 738, 746 (M.D. Tenn. 1990); Justice v.
NCAA, 577 F. Supp. 356, 382 (D. Ariz. 1983); Jones v. NCAA, 392 F. Supp. 295, 304 (D.
Mass. 1975); Weistart, supra note 5, at 173.
36. See, eg., NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 99 (1984); Hennessey v. NCAA,
564 F.2d 1136, 1149 n.14 (5th Cir. 1977); Gaines, 746 F. Supp. at 743.
37. See Weistart, supra note 5, at 177; infra notes 121-25 and accompanying text.
38. Weistart, supra note 5, at 177. For example, the NCAA should be able to limit direct
payments to its athletes. If it had no regulations governing payments to athletes, college ath-
letics would become in essence a professional sport.
39. A "cartel" is an organization of firms that makes agreements concerning such matters
as prices, outputs, market areas, the use and construction of productive capacity and advertis-
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The NCAA is structured as a single organization attempting to fur-
ther both academic integrity and economic interests-two goals that are
very difficult to reconcile.4' The problem arises when the NCAA, in an
attempt to further its economic interests, asserts a regulatory power ap-
propriate only to further its goals of academic integrity." When the
NCAA does this, it is asserting too much power, and may be violating
antitrust laws.42
The problem faced by those who challenge the NCAA's regulations
as antitrust violations has been one of separating the NCAA's two goals
and showing that the NCAA has been pursuing commercial gains in-
stead of educational gains.4 3 This problem is compounded by the fact
that, in an amateur sports context, the true motives of a particular regu-
lation can be masked with relative ease. 4
The NCAA obscures its cartel-like activities by acting as a pur-
ported self-regulatory organization with noncommercial goals.4, Courts
have traditionally given more leeway to self-regulatory organizations
than ordinary businesses under antitrust laws because self-regulatory or-
ing expenditures. JAMES V. KOCH, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION AND PRIcES 64 (1973). In
practical terms, a cartel increases the profits of its members by assigning quotas that reduce
production and raise prices. Becker, supra note 10, at 24. Although the NCAA is a single
entity, the adoption and execution of its bylaws are a result of the agreement and concert of
action of the members of the association. Hennessey, 564 F.2d at 1147. This structure is a
"combination" regulated by the Sherman Act. Id. In terms of the market for the student-
athlete, the NCAA limits the mobility of athletes, which increases their value as a result of
their limited availability. See infra notes 206-19 and accompanying text.
40. See Weistart, supra note 5, at 177. But see id. at 176-77 (listing advantages of having
single entity undertaking both endeavors).
41. Id.; see, eg., NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 119 (1984) ("[T]he NCAA
imposes a variety of other restrictions designed to preserve amateurism which are much better
tailored to the goal of competitive balance than is the television plan, and which are.., within
the NCAA's power to do so.").
42. See infra notes 121-25 and accompanying text.
43. When a plaintiff bringing suit against the NCAA shows that the NCAA is pursuing
purely commercial gains, courts have held that the NCAA violated antitrust law. See infra
notes 121-25 and accompanying text.
44. Weistart, supra note 5, at 177. By claiming that a regulation is furthering academic
interests, the NCAA has been able to regulate activities that would normally be per se viola-
tions of the Sherman Act. See infra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
45. A self-regulatory organization is a private organization that makes rules and sets stan-
dards regulating the conduct of its members' activities. Note, supra note 16, at 655. The term
"self-regulatory" means that there are no external checks on the organization's rules. The
reason that a self-regulatory organization is not subject to external checks is that a self-regula-
tory organization traditionally exercises its regulatory power for the benefit of a class broader
than its own membership. Id. at 665-66. Some examples of self-regulatory organizations are
bar associations, medical associations and school-accrediting agencies. Id. at 655 n.1.
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ganizations traditionally pursued noncommercial goals.' Thus, in addi-
tion to its role as a protector of "amateurism," the NCAA in past years
has hidden behind its label as a self-regulatory organization and has fur-
ther concealed its abuses of power.4' With such a potential for abuse,
self-regulation is no longer adequate,4" and external judicial control be-
comes both necessary and proper.49
III. THE NCAA AND ANTITRUST LAWS
A. Antitrust Laws Generally
Federal antitrust laws were enacted to prevent restraints on free
competition in business and commercial transactions.50 Because every
contract in a sense restrains trade, however, the Sherman Act prohibits
only unreasonable restraints of trade.51 Section 1 of the Sherman Act
forbids "[e]very contract, combination ... or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade." 2 Section 2 addresses the unlawful exercise of monopoly power,
stating that any "person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopo-
lize, or combine to conspire... to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States . . . shall be deemed guilty of a
felony."
5 3
1. Section 1 of the Sherman Act
Courts employ two basic approaches in applying section 1 of the
Sherman Act. A court can apply a per se rule, in which it labels certain
restraints of trade as illegal, regardless of the reasons for the restraints
46. Id. at 663-64. This leniency was based on the theory that antitrust laws were not
designed to apply to these organizations' activities, which were classified as "traditionally non-
commercial." Id. at 664. This became the "traditionally noncommercial" doctrine, which
originated in Maijorie Webster Junior College v. Middle States Ass'n of Colleges & Secondary
Schs., Inc., 432 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970).
47. For example, the goal of academic integrity can be achieved without a football broad-
cast policy, or an NCAA-controlled basketball tournament, or an elaborate media orientation
program. Weistart, supra note 5, at 176. Nevertheless, the NCAA regulates these activities.
Because these practices relate solely to the commercial activities of the NCAA, the NCAA
abuses its power as an educational protector in order to make commercial gains.
48. Again, because a self-regulatory organization's goals are traditionally noncommercial,
there is generally no need for external regulation. Note, supra note 16, at 665. However, when
commercial goals begin to dominate, and the organization begins to interfere with the eco-
nomic autonomy of its members, self-regulation is no longer sufficient as a protection because
the organization begins to act like a cartel. Weistart, supra note 5, at 175.
49. Weistart, supra note 5, at 177.
50. Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 493 (1940).
51. NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 98 (1984).
52. 15 U.S.C. § 1.
53. Id § 2.
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and without any extended inquiry.54 For example, both price fixing and
group boycotts are per se violations of the Sherman Act."5 These viola-
tions are termed "naked restraints," because they are often imposed
solely to inhibit competition.16 Thus, when activities are strictly an-
ticompetitive, courts will apply the per se rule and will not inquire into
the nature of the activity. 7
When conduct cannot be easily identified as anticompetitive, the
courts apply a "rule-of-reason" analysis, conducting a broad inquiry into
the nature, purpose and effect of the challenged arrangement before mak-
ing a decision about its legality. 8 Under this analysis, a court focuses on
the "market impact" of a challenged restraint. 9 This involves a two-fold
inquiry.' First, the court must identify the restraint's effect in a relevant
market.6 1 Second, the court must analyze the procompetitive justifica-
tions for the challenged practice.62 In determining effects on competi-
tion, the court examines both the economic and noneconomic values
associated with the activities. 3 An apparently anticompetitive restraint
54. LAWRENCE SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST § 59, at 153 (1977).
55. See, eg., Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941) (holding that group
boycott does not warrant rule-of-reason analysis because boycott clearly conflicts with princi-
ple of Sherman and Clayton Acts); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150
(1940) (holding that any form of price fixing is per se illegal under Sherman Act). Many argue
that the NCAA engages in both of these practices. See, e.g., James V. Koch, A Troubled
Cartel: The NCAA, 38 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 135, 138 (1973); Note, supra note 16, at
659-60. In terms of the market for student-athletes, one example of price fixing is the limit the
NCAA places on scholarships and other financial benefits that colleges may offer to student-
athletes. Koch, supra, at 138. This "capping" fixes the price of each athlete's collegiate career,
and in turn eliminates the student-athlete's ability to offer his or her services to the highest
bidder. Bhirdo et al., supra note 25, at 464. A group boycott in an NCAA context would
occur when the NCAA imposes sanctions against a member school prohibiting it from partici-
pating in competition. See McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338, 1342 (5th Cir. 1988).
56. Bhirdo et al., supra note 25, at 465.
57. SULLIVAN, supra note 54, § 67, at 182-83.
58. Bhirdo et al., supra note 25, at 465 (citing Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S.
1(1911)).
59. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 690, 692 (1978).
60. See, eg., FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 479 U.S. 447 (1986); NCAA v. Board of
Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
61. Goldman, supra note 11, at 225. In addition to the identification of a relevant market,
the party accused of the antitrust violation must have power within this market-it must have
"the power to control prices or exclude competition." United States v. E.I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956). Without market power, the parties' agreement has
no anticompetitive effect, and faces the discipline of the marketplace. Goldman, supra note 11,
at 226.
62. Goldman, supra note 11, at 226.
63. Id. Examination of noneconomic considerations may no longer be a factor under the
rule of reason. See Professional Engineers, 435 U.S. at 679; see also Barry Wertheimer, Note,
Rethinking the Rule of Reason: From Professional Engineers to NCAA, 1984 DUKE LJ. 1297
(1984) (discussing whether noneconomic considerations can be examined under rule-of-reason
1220
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will be upheld only if it is the least restrictive alternative, is reasonably
necessary or furthers a legitimate purpose." Courts traditionally have
used rule-of-reason analysis when nonprofit or noncommercial institu-
tions are involved,65 and they have consistently used rule-of-reason anal-
ysis in deciding cases brought against the NCAA 6
2. Section 2 of the Sherman Act
Section 2 of the Sherman Act makes it a crime to "monopolize, or
attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire... to monopolize" any
part of interstate or foreign commerce. An organization has violated
section 2 if it "deliberately follow[s] a course of market conduct through
which it has obtained or maintained power to control price or exclude
competition in some part of the trade or commerce covered by the act."68
In determining whether a violation of section 2 has occurred, courts
first attempt to define the relevant market in which to measure the al-
leged monopoly power.6 9 The definition of the relevant market is impor-
tant. If a court broadly defines the relevant market, the likelihood that a
monopoly exists decreases, because a broadly defined relevant market re-
analysis). The Tenth Circuit in Board of Regents cited the Professional Engineers case for the
proposition that "[n]oneconomic considerations, however worthy, cannot be used to justify
restraints that adversely affect competition." Board of Regents v. NCAA, 707 F.2d 1147, 1154
(1983), affid, 468 U.S. 85 (1984). Ignoring these noneconomic considerations, however, which
include education and amateurism, arguably prohibits the NCAA from performing its stated
function of maintaining the identity of intercollegiate athletics, and would make all NCAA
regulations that unreasonably restrain trade susceptible to the Sherman Act. See Wertheimer,
supra, at 1318.
64. Goldman, supra note 11, at 226; see, eg., NCAA v. B6ard of Regents, 468 U.S. 85
(1984); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
65. See, e.g., American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519 (1943) (applying
rule-of-reason analysis to nonprofit health-care group that was engaging in business under
antitrust law); Tondas v. Amateur Hockey Ass'n, 438 F. Supp. 310 (W.D.N.Y. 1977) (holding
that restrictions imposed by hockey organization are subject to rule-of-reason analysis).
66. See McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that NCAA's
interest in integrating athletics with academics warrants rule-of-reason analysis); Hennessey v.
NCAA, 564 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding that NCAA rules capping number of coaching
staff members per team not per se violations and upholding them under rule of reason); Justice
v. NCAA, 577 F. Supp. 356 (D. Ariz. 1983) (holding that attributes of per se illegal boycott do
not exist in NCAA's imposing sanctions against University of Arizona football team).
67. 15 U.S.C. § 2.
68. SULLIVAN, supra note 54, § 1, at 29 (citing United States v. Grinnell, 384 U.S. 563
(1966); United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956); United States v.
American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. I
(1911)).
69. See United States v. Grinnell, 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966); Gaines v. NCAA, 746 F.
Supp. 738, 745 (M.D. Tenn. 1990).
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quires a broader, more pervasive power on the part of the organization.7"
Conversely, if a court narrowly defines the relevant market, it will more
likely find that a monopoly exists.71
After the relevant market has been defined, courts apply a two-
prong test to determine whether an unlawful monopoly exists under sec-
tion 2.72 Under this test, an unlawful monopoly exists if a court finds
that both: (1) The organization has monopoly power in the relevant
market; and (2) the organization has willfully acquired or maintained
that power as distinguished from growing or developing as a consequence
of a superior product, business acumen or historic accident. 3
B. Litigation Involving the NCAA
In terms of regulatory power, the NCAA is clearly the dominant
organization in intercollegiate athletics.74 It is the only entity with sub-
stantial power over intercollegiate athletics in the United States.75 Be-
cause the NCAA's power is so great, a college wanting to operate a "big-
time" program76 in one of the major college sports, and an athlete want-
ing to participate in these programs, has no choice but to conform to the
NCAA's rules.77
With such a dominant position in the world of college athletics, it is
easy to characterize the NCAA as a cartel.71 Some of the NCAA's car-
tel-like activities include: (1) setting the maximum price that a university
can pay for participants in its intercollegiate athletic programs;79 (2) reg-
ulating the quantity of athletes that a university can purchase in a given
70. See Gaines, 746 F. Supp. at 745.
71. See id
72. SULLIVAN, supra note 54, § 8, at 30.
73. Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 570-71.
74. See Koch, supra note 55, at 135.
75. See Justice v. NCAA, 577 F. Supp. 356, 361 (D. Ariz. 1983). Although there are
other organizations such as the NAIA and the CFA, their powers are relatively inconsequen-
tial. Weistart, supra note 5, at 171-72.
76. "Big-time" in this context refers to highly commercialized intercollegiate athletics at
the Division I level. Rodney K. Smith, Little Ado About Something: Playing Games with the
Reform of Big-Time Intercollegiate Athletics, 20 CAP. U. L. REv. 567, 569 (1991). The most
highly commercialized sports are men's basketball and football. Examples of schools operat-
ing big-time programs are the University of Miami in football, and Duke University in basket-
ball. SPERBER, supra note 22, at 39, 42-43.
77. Weistart, supra note 5, at 172. These regulations are both broad-ranging and detailed,
dealing with issues such as an athlete's initial eligibility, his or her ability to afford tuition and
his or her course of study. Id As for the university, the NCAA regulates its relationships
with its athletes and coaching staffs, and the economic returns from its sports ventures. Id.
78. See supra note 39 for a definition of a cartel.
79. For example, the NCAA regulates the amount of scholarship money that a school can
give its athletes. NCAA, supra note 6, at 162 (Article 15.01.7 (Operating Bylaw)).
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time period;"0 (3) periodically informing member universities about
transactions, costs, market conditions and sales techniques;8' (4) pooling
and distributing portions of the association's profits, particularly those
that result from intercollegiate football and basketball; 2 and (5) policing
the behavior of its members and levying sanctions against those members
that violate its rules and regulations.
8 3
1. Section 1 antitrust litigation
Until recently, the NCAA and other self-regulatory organizations
were able to evade application of antitrust laws altogether.84 Immunity
was justified because antitrust laws did not apply to organizations whose
activities were noncommercial. 5 Under this theory, the Sherman Act
simply was not intended to apply to a self-regulatory organization with
noncommercial goals like the NCAA.86
The United States Supreme Court, however, rejected this theory in
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar. 7 The Court held that price fixing by a
bar association was illegal under the Sherman Act and ruled that profes-
sional self-regulatory organizations are not immune from antitrust scru-
tiny.88 The Court stated that "[t]he nature of an occupation, standing
alone, does not provide sanctuary from the Sherman Act." 89
As a result of the Goldfarb decision, the NCAA's anticompetitive
practices are susceptible to antitrust laws.90 Even when courts apply an
antitrust analysis, however, they apply a relaxed antitrust standard.9'
Under this standard, many of the NCAA's regulations, which might in
80. For example, the NCAA limits the number of athletic scholarships a member univer-
sity can give in any one year. Id (Article 15.01.9 (Operating Bylaw)).
81. This is accomplished through the NCAA News, the official newspaper of the NCAA.
82. For example, most conferences split revenues from college football bowl games among
the conference members. RICK TELANDER, THE HUNDRED YARD LIE 44 (1989).
83. Koch, supra note 55, at 136-37.
84. See Note, supra note 16, at 663-64.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 664.
87. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
88. Note, supra note 16, at 664.
89. Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 787 (citing Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 7
(1945)).
90. Note, supra note 16, at 665.
91. See, e-g., Hennessey v. NCAA, 564 F.2d 1136, 1151 (5th Cir. 1977); Justice v. NCAA,
577 F. Supp. 356, 380 (D. Ariz. 1983); see also Note, supra note 16, at 665 (discussing courts'
relaxed antitrust treatment of NCAA as result of NCAA's status as self-regulatory
organization).
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other contexts be per se violations of the Sherman Act,92 are reviewed
under the more lenient rule-of-reason analysis.9 3 The reason for this re-
laxed standard again lies in the view of the student-athlete as an "ama-
teur": Courts and even Congress have accorded special consideration to
the distinctive goals of educational institutions.94
In applying the rule-of-reason analysis to cases involving the
NCAA, courts have recognized that the NCAA acts in two relevant
markets with two purposes: the purely commercial, profit-driven market
in an effort to maximize revenues and the noncommercial, educational
market in order to preserve amateurism.9" When the NCAA regulates in
a purely commercial market, its activities are purely commercial, and
courts have held that it is subject to high antitrust scrutiny.96 In this
situation, the NCAA regulation being scrutinized is less likely to with-
stand the attack, because the NCAA's noncommercial goals are not be-
ing furthered and it is exceeding its regulatory power.97 On the other
hand, when the NCAA attempts to "maintain a discernible line between
amateurism and professionalism and protect the amateur objectives of
NCAA [athletics],"9" it acts in order to maintain the identity of college
athletics. As a result, even if the regulation has commercial effects, a
92. See Note, supra note 16, at 667 ("Wihen faced with conduct that would be per se
illegal in an ordinary commercial context, the court examines the conduct under the rule of
reason ....").
93. Applying per se rules may not be appropriate when a self-regulatory organization is
involved, because these organizations are theoretically interested in benefitting a class greater
than the regulated group. Id. at 666-67. If per se rules were applied to these organizations, a
great deal of legitimate and publicly desired activities might be prohibited. See id. Per se
application would also be unfair because courts would be unable to hold a hearing on the
justifications for the regulation's existence. See id at 665-66. Thus, instead of simply striking
down a regulation, under a rule-of-reason analysis, if a self-regulatory organization guilty of
what otherwise would be a per se violation can show a reasonable noncommercial purpose, its
conduct would be deemed reasonable under the Sherman Act. Id. at 669; see Hennessey, 564
F.2d at 1152.
94. Gulland et al., supra note 9, at 722-23.
95. See Gaines v. NCAA, 746 F. Supp. 738, 743 (M.D. Tenn. 1990).
96. See, eg., NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984) (holding that television re-
strictions on college football games are purely commercial and therefore violate Sherman Act);
Gaines, 746 F. Supp. at 743 (holding that NCAA eligibility rules are noncommercial and do
not violate Sherman Act).
97. When the regulation is related to a purely commercial market, the NCAA's interest in
maintaining amateurism is not furthered, and therefore the regulation arguably is not procom-
petitive. See Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 119 ("The television plan ... imposes a restriction
on one source of revenue that is more important to some colleges than to others .... [Tihe
NCAA imposes a variety of other restrictions designed to preserve amateurism which are
much better tailored to the goal of competitive balance than is the television plan."); infra part
IV.B.
98. Gaines, 746 F. Supp. at 743.
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court will probably deem the regulation reasonable, regardless of its reg-
ulatory effects. 99
Plaintiffs who bring suit against the NCAA often have problems
separating the NCAA's commercial and noncommercial activities. Tra-
ditionally, when courts have applied antitrust law to an NCAA regula-
tion, they rarely have ruled the regulation to be related to a purely
commercial market."co As a result, once a court finds that the NCAA
regulation is related to the NCAA's noncommercial goals, it generally
will uphold the regulation as being procompetitive.
101
Thus, under the rule-of-reason analysis, most NCAA regulations
have withstood scrutiny. Because the NCAA can easily mask its regula-
tions behind its stated educational objectives,1" 2 the burden of proving
that the NCAA acts in purely commercial markets has been a difficult
one.10 3 Consequently, courts often find that the relevant market being
regulated is a noncommercial one. Once the market is deemed noncom-
99. See Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 118; see also, eg., Hennessey v. NCAA, 564 F.2d
1136 (5th Cir. 1977); Justice v. NCAA, 577 F. Supp. 356 (D. Ariz. 1983); Jones v. NCAA, 392
F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1975).
[The NCAA seeks to market a particular brand of football-college football. The
identification of this "product" with an academic tradition differentiates college foot-
ball and makes it more popular than professional sports to which it might be compa-
rable .... Thus, the NCAA plays a vital role in enabling college football to preserve
its character, and as a result enables a product to be marketed which might otherwise
be unavailable. In performing this role-its actions widen consumer choice-not
only the choices available to sports fans but also those available to athletes-and
hence can be viewed as procompetitive.
Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 102 (emphasis added).
100. See, e.g., McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that NCAA
eligibility rules imposing "Death Penalty" on Southern Methodist University's football pro-
gram were reasonable and therefore did not violate antitrust law); Hennessey, 546 F.2d at 1136
(upholding rules limiting number of coaching staff members under rule-of-reason analysis);
Gaines, 746 F. Supp. at 738 (holding that eligibility rules relating to NFL Draft exist to protect
amateurism and therefore are not unreasonably anticompetitive); Justice, 577 F. Supp. at 356
(holding that NCAA's imposition of sanctions on University of Arizona was not manifestly
anticompetitive group boycott and that per se rules did not apply); Jones, 392 F. Supp. at 295
(holding that anticompetitive effect of NCAA rules was merely incidental result of NCAA's
educational goals).
101. Courts generally have held these restrictions reasonable based on the premise that they
preserve amateurism, maintain the identity of intercollegiate athletics as being distinct from
professional athletics and to prevent the commercialization of intercollegiate athletics at the
expense of educational values. See Goldman, supra note 11, at 232.
102. See Weistart, supra note 5, at 177. The United States Supreme Court in NCAA v.
Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984), stated that eligibility rules are assumed to be reasonable
and not anticompetitive because they "enhance public interest in intercollegiate athletics." Id
at 117.
103. An examination of antitrust litigation against the NCAA is evidence of this difficulty.
See infra notes 105-19 and accompanying text.
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mercial, courts take into account the NCAA's educational objectives and
find the regulation to be reasonable."°
Illustrative of the courts' traditional treatment of the NCAA is Hen-
nessey v. NCAA . 5 In Hennessey, a college football coach challenged an
NCAA rule limiting the size of school coaching staffs as a violation of
antitrust laws; the court upheld the rule. 10 6 The court first acknowl-
edged that college athletics is a commercial venture: "[A]mateur athlet-
ics [is] a business venture of far greater magnitude than the vast majority
of 'profit-making' enterprises.""0 7 The NCAA was engaged in a group
boycott, normally a per se violation; 1 8 however, the court refused to ap-
ply a per se approach in examining the restriction." 9 Instead, it held
that a rule-of-reason analysis was proper, not because of the nature of the
practice, but because the market involved was not purely commercial. 110
Because the market was not purely commercial, the important, educa-
tion-oriented goals of the NCAA would be overlooked under a rigid, per
se analysis.' After balancing the commercial impact of the restriction
against the objectives of "preserv[ing] and foster[ing] competition in in-
tercollegiate athletics" and maintaining "the programs in[ ] their tradi-
tional role as amateur sports operating as part of the educational
processes,"' 1 2 the court held that the restriction was reasonable. 1 3
Another representative case is Banks v. NCAA, I 4 in which a former
college football player sought to invalidate the NCAA's no-draft and no-
agent rules. In 1990, Braxston Banks hired an agent and entered the
National Football League (NFL) draft, even though he had one year of
college eligibility remaining. Although no professional team chose Banks
in the draft and although he received no compensation from any team or
agent, the NCAA declared him ineligible to play college football. 11
Banks sued for a preliminary injunction against the NCAA and his
school, the University of Notre Dame, to prevent enforcement of the no-
draft and no-agent rules.
104. See, eg., McCormack, 845 F.2d at 1343; Justice, 577 F. Supp. at 382.
105. 564 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1977).
106. Id. at 1154.
107. Id. at 1149 n.14.
108. Note, supra note 16, at 667 (citing Hennessey v. NCAA, 564 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir.
1977)).
109. Hennessey, 564 F.2d at 1151.
110. Id. at 1151-53.
111. Id. at 1152-53.
112. Id at 1153.
113. Id. at 1154.
114. 977 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1992).
115. Id. at 1083-84.
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Banks argued that these rules violated section 1 of the Sherman Act
because they were concerted boycotts of his football skills by NCAA in-
stitutions and they restricted his mobility in the football players' mar-
ket.I16 Under the rule-of-reason analysis, the court held that there was a
market in which Banks could have alleged an anticompetitive impact. I 7
Because Banks failed to properly identify the proper market, however,
the court dismissed the case.a1 ' Even if a proper market had been identi-
fied, the court indicated that the rules satisfied the rule of reason.11 9
Only when an NCAA regulation is clearly and unequivocally re-
lated to a purely commercial market will the courts find a regulation
anticompetitive and thus in violation of antitrust law. The landmark
case of NCAA v. Board of Regents12 involved such a situation. Board of
Regents was a suit by several universities against the NCAA after the
NCAA had disciplined the universities for forming their own group and
negotiating their own network television contract. 2 '
The Supreme Court based its holding on the premise that college
athletics is not simply a sideline to academics, but rather a commercial
venture.1 22 The Court ruled in favor of the universities, holding that the
NCAA's practice of asserting an exclusive right and arranging the broad-
casting of games on behalf of its member colleges amounted to illegal
price fixing. 23 Additionally, the Court held that the NCAA's practice
116. Id. at 1084.
117. Id. at 1087 ("'[W]e do not dispute that [Banks] could have alleged an anticompetitive
impact.").
118. Id. at 1087-88.
119. Id. at 1089.
The no-draft rule has no more impact on the market for college football players than
other NCAA eligibility requirements .... None of the NCAA rules affecting college
football eligibility restrain trade in the market for college players because the NCAA
does not exist as a minor league training ground for future NFL players .... [T]he
regulations of the NCAA are designed to preserve the honesty and integrity of inter-
collegiate athletics and foster fair competition among the participating amateur col-
lege students.
Id. at 1089-90.
120. 468 U.S. 85 (1984). This case is a "landmark" one only in the sense that a court finally
acknowledged that the NCAA participated in purely commercial, monopolistic behavior. Id.
at 119-20; Charlotte Low, NCAA's TV Pact on Football Held Antitrust Violation In Suit by
Colleges, L.A. DAILY J., June 28, 1984, at 1.
121. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 94-95.
122. Id. at 120 ('[C]onsistent with the Sherman Act, the role of the NCAA must be to
preserve a tradition that might otherwise die; rules that restrict output are hardly consistent
with this role.").
123. Id. ("[B]y curtailing output and blunting the ability of member institutions to respond
to consumer preference, the NCAA has restricted rather than enhanced the place of intercolle-
giate athletics in the Nation's life.").
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limited output by reducing the number of college football games avail-
able to television viewers. 124
Board of Regents does not represent the downfall of the NCAA,
however. Regulation of television contracts involves a purely commer-
cial market and is part of the NCAA's commercial goal-television con-
tracts have nothing to do with the universities, their athletes or
education. 125 Because the market involved was purely commercial, the
NCAA's eligibility rules were not involved. Consequently, the NCAA's
procompetitive justifications for regulation were not implicated.' 26 On
the other hand, when a university or an athlete is involved in the com-
mercial aspect of college athletics, the line between commercial and non-
commercial markets is much less clear. In this situation, the NCAA can
argue that the regulation is related to its goals of preserving amateurism
and promoting fair competition. As a result, courts have generally held
that these regulations are procompetitive and are therefore reasonable.1
27
2. Section 2 litigation
While actions brought against the NCAA under section 2 are rare,
they also have been, for the most part, unsuccessful. Illustrative of the
courts' treatment of actions brought under section 2 is Gaines v.
NCAA,' 28 a case involving a college football player and the NFL
Draft.'2 9 The plaintiff, Bradford Gaines, left school after his junior year
and applied for the NFL Draft. After no team drafted him, he applied
for and was denied reinstatement as an eligible athlete for intercollegiate
competition. 3 He brought suit against the NCAA, arguing that by
preventing undrafted underclassmen from returning to college play, the
NCAA engaged in the exercise of unlawful monopoly power in violation
of section 2.131
124. Idi
125. See id at 119 ("[IThe NCAA imposes a variety of other restrictions designed to pre-
serve amateurism which are much better tailored to the goal of competitive balance than is the
television plan."). The Court in Board of Regents held that the relevant market was the live
college football television market. Id. at 111-13.
126. Idi at 119.
127. See id.; see, eg., Hennessey v. NCAA, 564 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1977); Justice v.
NCAA, 577 F. Supp. 356 (D. Ariz. 1983); Jones v. NCAA, 392 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1975).
128. 746 F. Supp. 738 (M.D. Tenn. 1990).
129. The draft is the mechanism by which players entering the NFL are allocated to teams.
Robert A. McCormick & Matthew C. McKinnon, Professional Football's Draft Eligibility
Rule: The Labor Exemption and the Antitrust Laws, 33 EMoRY L.J. 375, 387 n.60 (1984).
130. Gaines, 746 F. Supp. at 740-41.
131. Id at 741.
[Vol. 26:12131228
ILLEGAL PROCEDURES
In determining the relevant market in which to examine the alleged
monopoly power, the court considered two possibilities: (1) the market
for major college football services, which consists of football players at
Division I-A132 schools in the NCAA; and (2) the professional football
recruitment market.13 3 The court, however, did not decide which market
was the relevant market, and instead proceeded directly to the two-prong
test. 134
The court spent relatively little time analyzing whether the NCAA
had monopoly power under the first prong, primarily because Gaines'
argument failed the second prong of the test.135 Under the second prong,
the court ruled that the NCAA did not willfully acquire or maintain its
monopoly power. 136 Instead, the court determined that the NCAA had
legitimate business reasons for refusing to reinstate Gaines.13 7 The court
found that the preservation of college football's amateur appeal was a
legitimate reason: "[T]his regulation by the NCAA in fact makes a bet-
ter 'product' available by maintaining the educational underpinnings of
college football and preserving the stability and integrity of college foot-
ball programs."' 138  Thus, the court ruled that, even though the NCAA
had monopoly power, its legitimate business concerns in this situation
justified its rules, and therefore such rules could not be "unreasonably
exclusionary" or "anticompetitive" 1 3 9 under the second element of a sec-
tion 2 analysis.
Other courts also have flatly rejected arguments under the "willful
acquisition" element of the second prong of the test. For example, in
Jones v. NCAA, 1 4 the plaintiff, who had played professional hockey
132. For a list of the requirements that must be met to qualify as a Division I-A football
team, see NCAA, supra note 6, at 344-46 (Article 20.9.6 (Operating Bylaw)).
133. Gaines, 746 F. Supp. at 745. These proposed relevant markets are actually the markets
that each party argued was the relevant market-Gaines argued for the former, the NCAA
for the latter. Id
134. Id See supra notes 72-73 for a discussion of the two-prong test.
135. Gaines, 746 F. Supp. at 745. In the market for intercollegiate athletics, the NCAA
clearly has monopoly power. Goldman, supra note 11, at 226-27 ("The NCAA rules college
sports. NCAA regulations directly restrain price competition and result in compensations [to
student-athletes] below fair market levels."). See Goldman, supra note 11, at 226-31 for a
discussion of why the intercollegiate athletic market, and not a broader general entertainment
market, is the relevant market regarding student-athletes.
136. Gaines, 746 F. Supp. at 746.
137. Id "The United States Supreme Court has stated that an entity with monopoly power
does not violate § 2 [of the Sherman Act] by refusing to deal with a competitor if there are
valid business reasons for the refusal." Id. (citing Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing
Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 597, 605 (1985)).
138. Id
139. I1d
140. 392 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1975).
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before attending college, sued the NCAA after being declared ineligi-
ble.14 ' The court held that the NCAA's eligibility rules were not made
for the purpose of forming a monopoly.142 Additionally, it ruled that the
NCAA's domination in the field was the result of its own "skill, foresight
and industry."' 4 3 Consequently, the court held that the second prong
was not satisfied, and denied the plaintiff's request for injunctive relief."4
Thus, while the courts have applied antitrust laws to the NCAA's
regulations, they have traditionally been very lenient in their scrutiny.
The modem trend in antitrust litigation is that while courts recognize the
NCAA's actions in commercial markets, they still defer to the stated
goal of intercollegiate athletics as a part of the educational system. Con-
sequently, under both sections 1 and 2, the NCAA has generally been
able to avoid antitrust liability.
IV. A STUDENT-ATHLETE'S CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE
NCAA
Although a student-athlete has never prevailed in a suit against the
NCAA for antitrust violations, 45 and in spite of rather substantial case
law supporting the NCAA's positions, the obstacles blocking success are
not as insurmountable as they seem. The NCAA is less protected than it
appears to be because the judicial system consistently has relied on the
NCAA's stated academic goals in striking down antitrust challenges. 
146
In both section 1 and section 2 cases, the predominant factor upon which
courts have relied to strike down challenges has been the goal being pur-
sued by the NCAA's regulations of the student-athlete. 47 Under this
141. Id. at 297-98.
142. Id at 304.
143. Id
144. Id
145. See, eg., Banks v. NCAA, 977 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1992); Gaines v. NCAA, 746 F.
Supp. 738 (M.D. Tenn. 1990); Justice v. NCAA, 577 F. Supp. 356 (D. Ariz. 1983); Jones v.
NCAA, 392 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1975).
146. See, e.g., McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338, 1345 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that
NCAA eligibility rules imposing "Death Penalty" on Southern Methodist University's men's
football program were reasonable and therefore did not violate antitrust law); Gaines, 746 F.
Supp. at 746 (holding that eligibility rules relating to NFL Draft exist to protect amateurism
and therefore are not unreasonably anticompetitive); Justice, 577 F. Supp. at 356 (holding that
NCAA's imposition of sanctions on University of Arizona was reasonably related to NCAA's
legitimate goals of preserving amateurism and promoting fair competition); Jones, 392 F.
Supp. at 304 (holding that anticompetitive effect of NCAA rules was merely incidental result
of NCAA's educational goals).
147. Recall that under § 1, what might otherwise be per se violations are normally ex-
amined under a rule-of-reason analysis in order to give the NCAA a chance to reconcile its
regulations with its academic objectives. See supra notes 91-100 and accompanying text.
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view, courts have viewed the market for college athletes as a noncom-
mercial one, related to the furtherance of academic goals.148 Because
regulations relating to these markets exist for the benefit of amateur
sports, they are viewed as procompetitive.
149
These stated academic goals, while admirable, are in fact illusory-
the NCAA runs intercollegiate athletics as a purely commercial ven-
ture. 5 In attacking an NCAA regulation, the best strategy for the stu-
dent-athlete is to attack the NCAA's stated fundamental purpose of
pursuing academic goals. If a student-athlete can successfully show that
the NCAA's true motives are purely commercial, courts will not con-
sider the regulations to be related to preserving amateurism. The NCAA
would then be stripped of its protection as an organization with procom-
petitive goals, because the basis for the courts' deference to the NCAA's
judgment would not exist. Consequently, if the NCAA were to be
judged purely as a commercial entity, its rules would be more likely to be
held unreasonably anticompetitive and would consequently fall to anti-
trust attack.151
A suit by a student-athlete should attack an eligibility rule that spe-
cifically restricts the student, 5 2 and the student-athlete could ask for
either monetary damages or injunctive relief.153 Specific eligibility rules
would be easiest to attack because the sole purpose of these rules is to
restrict the student-athletes.1 54 Consequently, because a student-athlete
Under § 2, academic concerns are considered a legitimate business justification for monopoliz-
ing. See Gaines, 746 F. Supp. at 746; Jones, 392 F. Supp. at 304.
148. In the educational context, there arguably is no "market," because intercollegiate ath-
letics exist to foster educational goals, not commercial gain.
149. NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 102 (1984).
150. See infra part IV.B. Each university is responsible for making sure that it adheres to
the NCAA rules. NCAA, supra note 6, at 8 (Article 3 (Constitution)). Because this responsi-
bility usually rests on athletic administrators whose main goal is to field winning teams and
generate revenues, many administrators ignore the academic well-being of the student-athlete.
Robert Sullivan, A Study in Frustration, SPORTS ILLUSTRATE), June 19, 1989, at 94.
151. For example, if the courts did not apply a relaxed antitrust standard, the NCAA regu-
lations involving price fixing and group boycotting would be per se violations of the Sherman
Act. See supra note 55.
152. For example, a student could attack eligibility rules that directly limit the amount of
financial aid he or she can get, NCAA, supra note 6, at 164 (Article 15.1 (Operating Bylaw)),
that limit the right to transfer without losing athletic eligibility, id. at 147-55 (Article 14.6
(Operating Bylaw)), and that limit rights concerning professional drafts, id at 71 (Article
12.2.5.1 (Operating Bylaw)). This Comment does not address any possible claims a university
might have against regulations that directly restrict it.
153. See, eg., McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338, 1341 (5th Cir. 1988) (discussing
standing in action against NCAA for money damages); Justice v. NCAA, 577 F. Supp. 356,
375-78 (D. Ariz. 1983) (discussing standing in action against NCAA for injunctive relief).
154. McCorrmack, 845 F.2d at 1342-43; see also Goldman, supra note 11, at 210-11 ("The
NCAA's amateurism rules seek to restrain the competition among its member institutions....
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is restricted from selling his or her labor-his or her athletic skills-to
the highest bidder, arguably the student-athlete suffers an injury to his or
her "business" of playing the sport.' 5
A. Standing
The first issue a court addresses in an antitrust suit is whether the
plaintiff has standing. 5 6 To establish standing, the plaintiff must show
that the injuries suffered are of the type against which antitrust laws are
meant to protect.15 7 The determination of standing depends on what
type of damages the plaintiff is seeking. Once a plaintiff satisfies the pre-
requisites for relief by showing that the NCAA has yiolated the Sherman
Act, a court will determine what type of damages should be awarded
under the Clayton Act. 5 8
1. Standing to recover monetary damages
Section 4 of the Clayton Act permits a plaintiff with standing to
assert an antitrust claim to recover treble damages for violations of the
Sherman Act.159 In determining whether a party is a "proper plaintiff,"
a court must examine: (1) whether the plaintiff's injuries or their causal
link to the defendant are speculative; (2) whether other parties have been
more directly harmed by the alleged violation; and (3) whether allowing
this plaintiff to sue would risk multiple lawsuits, duplicative recoveries or
complex damage apportionment."6
In applying these factors to student-athletes, some courts have not
used a rigid test, but instead have held that professional sports athletes
have "surmounted the standing inquiry simply because their injuries
have stemmed at least in part from restraints in the labor market it-
self. I" Similarly, the NCAA's eligibility rules are restrictions in the
[Tihe expected and actual market consequences of the NCAA's rules are a reduction in the
wages of student-athletes.").
155. See id. at 1342.
156. See id. at 1341; Hennessey v. NCAA, 564 F.2d 1136, 1147-48 (5th Cir. 1977); Justice,
577 F. Supp. at 375-78.
157. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 429 U.S. 477, 487-89 (1977) (holding that
antitrust plaintiffs must prove "injury of the type that antitrust laws were intended to
prevent").
158. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990); Board of Regents v. NCAA, 546 F.
Supp. 1276, 1324 (W.D. Okla. 1982), affld, 468 U.S. 85 (1984); Justice, 577 F. Supp. at 375.
159. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1988 & Supp. II 1990).
160. Associated Gen. Contractors v. California State Council, 459 U.S. 519, 545 (1983).
161. McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338, 1342 (5th Cir. 1988) (quoting Adams v. Pan
Am. World Airways, Inc., 828 F.2d 24, 28 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (citing Radovich v. National
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labor market of intercollegiate athletics.' 62 Eligibility rules are aimed
specifically at restricting the student-athlete's compensation, and are thus
the direct cause of the student's injuries. 6 3 Consequently, a student-ath-
lete should have standing to sue for money damages.
164
2. Standing to compel injunctive relief
Section 16 of the Clayton Act permits courts to issue injunctive re-
lief for antitrust violations. 165 In order to obtain injunctive relief under
section 16, the plaintiff must show: "(1) a threatened loss or injury cog-
nizable in equity, (2) proximately resulting from the alleged antitrust
violations."'
166
To obtain injunctive relief, the plaintiff need not show injury to busi-
ness or property as required in an action for monetary damages. Instead,
courts require only a showing of a threatened injury.' 67 This threatened
injury must be significant, however; speculative injuries are not sufficient
to show standing.1 68 In a student-athlete's situation, the injury is real-
the student-athlete is prevented from earning the highest price for his or
Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957); Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1175 n.2
(D.C. Cir. 1978))).
162. While the NCAA has consistently argued that it does not possess market power be-
cause the relevant market is the broad entertainment market, courts have generally held that it
does. See NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 111 (1984) C'[I]t is evident that [the
NCAA] does possess market power... [I]ntercollegiate football telecasts generate an audi-
ence uniquely attractive to advertisers and... competitors are unable to offer programming
that can attract a similar audience."). In terms of the eligibility rules of the student-athlete,
the NCAA possesses market power because student-athletes have no alternatives to intercolle-
giate athletics. Goldman, supra note 11, at 227-28.
163. McCormack, 845 F.2d at 1342. Note that in McCormack, the court stated that the
student-athlete was not the party most directly injured. Instead, it held that the institution,
Southern Methodist University, was the party most directly harmed. Id The McCormnack
case is distinguishable because it involved the suspension of the school's football program, id.
at 1340; it did not involve eligibility rules governing student-athletes.
164. See id.
165. 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1988 & Supp. II 1990).
166. City of Rohnert Park v. Harris, 601 F.2d 1040 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S.
961 (1980). Courts sitting in equity will also consider whether a plaintiff has an alternative
remedy at law. Board of Regents v. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. 1276, 1325 (W.D. Okla. 1982), affd,
468 U.S. 85 (1984). Because the NCAA completely controls the market for student-athletes,
damages to the student-athlete, while available, would be difficult to calculate. See id More-
over, the student-athlete would have to file a lawsuit every year to recover money damages
caused by the NCAA. Id.
167. Board of Regents, 546 F. Supp. at 1325.
168. See Blue Shield v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 475 n.11 (1981).
1234 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:1213
her labor.1 69  Consequently, the plaintiff has a good argument that a
threat of injury exists.' 7 °
A plaintiff must also show that the significant threat of injury proxi-
mately results from a violation of antitrust laws, and must also show that
the threat of injury is likely to continue or recur.1 71 Again, a student-
athlete should be able to show that injury is proximately caused by the
NCAA's regulation. By capping the amount of money that a student-
athlete can receive, the NCAA engages in price fixing. 172 This price fix-
ing not only causes the student-athlete's injury, but is also a per se viola-
tion of antitrust laws.1 73 Consequently, a student-athlete also should
have standing to request injunctive relief against the NCAA.174
B. The Fallacy of the NCAA's Academic Goals
In the big-time market of intercollegiate athletics, the NCAA's aca-
demic goals are fallacious because neither the NCAA nor the student-
athlete pursues them. The NCAA-with consent from a school's ath-
letic department-regulates intercollegiate athletics with a single goal: to
make money.' 75 In addition, many student-athletes participate in inter-
collegiate athletics as a stepping stone to professional sports.
176
In a suit against the NCAA, the student-athlete's main priority
would be to show that the NCAA in fact regulates college athletics solely
to make money. There are four arguments an athlete might employ.
169. See McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338, 1342 (5th Cir. 1988) (explaining that foot-
ball players "in effect sell their labor" to university); cf Tugboat, Inc. v. Mobile Towing Co.,
534 F.2d 1172, 1176 (5th Cir. 1976) (holding that selling of labor is commercial interest).
170. Of course, if an injury actually exists, the requirement of a threat of an injury is satis-
fied. Compare a student-athlete's injury with the injury alleged in Justice v. NCAA, 577 F.
Supp. 356 (D. Ariz. 1983), in which the court held that the threatened injury of a loss of a
potential professional contract after the NCAA had imposed sanctions on the university's foot-
ball team was too speculative to give the plaintiffs standing. Justice, 577 F. Supp. at 376. A
similar situation involving the student-athlete in the intercollegiate athletic market is distin-
guishable, because eligibility rules directly prevent the student-athlete from getting the highest
price for his or her labor.
171. Id. at 376 (citing Zenith Radio v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 130 (1969)).
172. See supra note 55.
173. See supra note 55.
174. Asking for injunctive relief may be a better strategy than seeking damages. If a court
grants the injunction, the regulation would be declared invalid, and the student-athlete might
be free to sell his or her services to the highest bidder. Cf Kapp v. National Football League,
390 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (holding that NFL enforcement of certain league rules,
including standard player contract, was patently unreasonable and invalid under antitrust
laws), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 967 (1979).
175. SPERBER, supra note 22, at 345; James V. Koch, The Economic Realities of Amateur
Sports Organization, 61 IND. L. Rnv. 9, 15 (1985).
176. TELANDER, supra note 82, at 29.
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These arguments concern: (1) the definition of "amateurism";... (2) how
a typical college athletic program is run;178 (3) the academic require-
ments for student-athletes; 179 and (4) the NCAA enforcement process.18
1. Amateurism
"An amateur student-athlete is one who engages in a particular
sport for the educational, physical, mental and social benefits derived
therefrom and for whom participation in that sport is an avocation."'
81
While the concept of amateurism seems noble, it is in fact a myth.
182
The paradigm of an amateur athlete has traditionally been linked to the
Olympic ideal, which mandates that amateur athletes participate in
sports for the sheer love of the game.18 3 However, even the tradition of
this ideal is incorrect: The ancient Olympics had nothing to do with
amateurism. 181 In fact, in ancient Greece, an athlete was required to be a
professional to compete in the Olympics.' Thus, the NCAA's adher-
ence to this traditional notion of amateurism is unreasonable.
Furthermore, financial incentives for participation have existed in
intercollegiate athletics since the mid-1800s. 186 For example, the first in-
tercollegiate competition in the United States, a crew race between Yale
and Harvard universities in 1852, was funded by the Boston, Concord
and Montreal Railroad Company. 8 7 The railroad paid both teams' ex-
penses, and the winner of the race, Harvard, received an expensive set of
matched black walnut oars.1 88 Other examples included routine cash
prizes for college track athletes, and cash prizes and silver goblets-
which were supposedly worth twice what an average laborer might earn
in a year-for winners of college rowing competitions. 8 9 Professional-
ism was also prevalent in the 1800s. The very first intercollegiate football
game, between Rutgers and Princeton universities in 1869, featured four
177. See infra part IV.B.1.
178. See infra part IV.B.2.
179. See infra part IV.B.3.
180. See infra part IV.B.4.
181. NCAA, supra note 6, at 67 (Article 12.02.1 (Operating Bylaw)).
182. TELANDER, supra note 82, at 49.
183. Id. Note that even the International Olympic Committee has discarded its own ideal,
as evidenced by the participation of professional basketball and tennis players in the 1992
Summer Olympics in Barcelona, Spain.
184. Id.
185. Id. To compete in the Olympics, an athlete had to prove that he was a full-time ath-
lete, which meant that he had done nothing but train for three months prior to the games. Id.
186. Id at 52.
187. Id
188. Id.
189. Id
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athletes "who could have been ruled academically ineligible." 19  Addi-
tionally, the University of Michigan football team of the 1890s had seven
players with absolutely no connection with the university.1 91
The question that naturally arises is: How did amateurism come to
dominate college athletics? The adoption of this ideal can be directly
attributed to the desire of athletic departments to make money. 192 In the
early 1900s, when university officials took control of college athletics,
they realized how much money could be made.1 93 They also realized
that revenue-producing sports had no place in the collegiate world, and,
hence, heavily promoted the Olympic ideal to justify these sports'
existence. 
194
These same commercial motivations exist today, albeit in different
forms. For example, under current tax laws, student-athletes are in fact
contractual employees of the university.195 If an athletic scholarship was
considered pay, the NCAA would lose its tax-exempt status. 96 Thus, by
maintaining the illusion that an athlete is not a paid employee, the
NCAA saves a great deal of money in taxes.
2. The administration of athletic programs
The NCAA's commercial motives are also demonstrated by the way
in which most college athletic departments are run. Typically, the ath-
letic department is a separate entity from the university. 19 7 It hires its
own coaches, determines its own budget and buys its own equipment. 198
This autonomy reflects the separation of the NCAA's purported inter-
ests: The universities are responsible for turning out educated, ethical,
190. Id
191. Id
192. Id at 53-55.
193. Telander, supra note 7, at 96.
194. See id The amateur label performs a number of important functions for the universi-
ties: "It allows the college sports industry to avoid the labor costs of open professionalism,"
and "it confers a 'special status' on intercollegiate athletics that makes it more compatible with
the 'high culture' one associates with academic life." LAPCHICK & SLAUGHTER, supra note
25, at 79.
195. SPERBER, supra note 22, at 205-06. The athletes' "pay" includes free tuition and fees,
course textbooks, and room and board. Id The Internal Revenue Service rule on barter and
noncash payments is: "[I]f services are paid for in property [or] in exchange for other services,
the fair market value of such other services taken in payment must be included in income."
Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(c) (1969). The IRS rule on educational assistance also seems to apply:
"The exclusion from gross income for qualified scholarships is not available for that portion of
any amount received which represents payment for ... services by the student which are
required as a condition for receiving the qualified scholarship." I.R.C. § 117(c) (1988).
196. SPERBER, supra note 22, at 205.
197. LAPCHICK & SLAUGHTER, supra note 25, at 114; TELANDER, supra note 82, at 642.
198. TELANDER, supra note 82, at 60.
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well-rounded adults, while the athletics departments are responsible for
generating revenues. 199 This separation is further evinced by the fact
that revenues generated by college athletics bypass the university and go
straight into the coffers of the athletic department. 2" The athletic de-
partment then uses the revenue to support only itself, by increasing its
staff or building more athletic facilities.201
Further evidence of the commercial nature of college athletics is the
athletic scholarship. In response to the athletic departments' complaints
over unproductive players on scholarship, the NCAA allowed universi-
ties to switch from the four-year guaranteed scholarship to the one-year
renewable scholarship in 1972.202 As a result, the university can revoke
the scholarship of an unproductive athlete after one year, making a
scholarship available for a new recruit who has greater potential for suc-
cess. This switch evinces the true commercial motives behind college
athletics programs. If a university was actually concerned about the edu-
cation of an athlete, it would guarantee the student-athletes' scholarships
for four years. This would give the athlete a chance to obtain his or her
degree regardless of his or her performance in athletics. By making
scholarships revocable after one year, the university increases its chances
for fielding a superior sports team, which invariably leads to increased
revenue.
20 3
Once an athlete accepts a scholarship, the athletic department's goal
is to maximize the athlete's production. 2" The athletic department ac-
complishes this by severely limiting the athlete's right to "move
freely. ' 20 5 From the day a high school athlete signs a letter of intent
with a university, that athlete must stay and work with that university's
199. Id.
200. Telander, supra note 7, at 102-03.
201. Id.
202. SPERBER, supra note 22, at 206-07; Harry M. Cross, The College Athlete and the Insti-
tution, 38 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 151, 156 n.45 (1973). For the present rule on the re-
newal of athletic scholarships, see NCAA, supra note 6, at 172 (Article 15.3.5 (Operating
Bylaw)).
203. By having a superior team, attendance at sporting events, television exposure and mar-
ketability increase. Deborah A. Katz, What Are the "Bases" in University Athletics? Comment
on "Athletic Reform: Missing the Bases in University Athletics", 20 CAP. U. L. Rnv. 611, 614
(1991). This in turn leads to increased revenue for the athletic department. L; Telander,
supra note 7, at 102.
204. SPERBER, supra note 22, at 210.
205. "Move freely" means either leaving for professional sports or transferring to a different
school. Id "Star" players would be most likely to move freely. Id at 211.
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program or face severe penalties.2 °6 For example, an athlete who signs
with a university but decides to attend another university without ob-
taining the first school's permission is penalized by being barred from
intercollegiate sports for two years. 20 7 This cancels two years--or fifty
percent-of the athlete's eligibility to compete in intercollegiate athlet-
ics. 20 8 Even if the university releases the athlete, NCAA rules still re-
quire the athlete to wait a year and forfeit one year of eligibility. °9 Such
strict rules are not intended to help an athlete get an education-most
athletes can get an excellent education at one of several different universi-
ties. 210 By severely restricting the athlete's movement, the university can
immediately begin to reap the benefits of the athlete and be assured of his
or her production for the next four years.
Another restriction designed to maximize the athlete's production is
found in the agreements between the NCAA and both the National Bas-
ketball Association (NBA) and the NFL.211 These agreements required
an athlete to complete all four years of eligibility before becoming eligible
for the professional draft. Although these rules have been relaxed in re-
cent years, and even though they probably violate antitrust laws,21 the
NCAA still restricts movement by imposing harsh penalties for early
movement to a professional sports league. These penalties include loss of
any remaining intercollegiate eligibility for declaring for the draft, even if
the athlete is not drafted,21 3 and levying fines against professional teams
for approaching undergraduates prior to the draft.214
The motivation for these rules is clear: money. For example, if a
would-be Heisman Trophy215 candidate leaves school early, the school
206. Id at 210. The NCAA provides an extensive schedule of when in the high school
athlete's senior year a student-athlete may sign. See NCAA, supra note 6, at 81-118 (Article
13 (Operating Bylaw)).
207. NCAA, supra note 6, at 147-55 (Article 14.6.1-.6 (Operating Bylaw)).
208. SPERBER, supra note 22, at 210-11.
209. Id
210. These rules exist for the benefit of athletic directors and coaches, who have invested
their time recruiting the athletes, and who want to maximize the profit from their "invest-
ment" by having the athlete stay through all four years of his or her eligibility. Id. at 210.
211. Id. at 211-12.
212. Id at 212; see also Boris v. United States Football League, No. 83-4980, 1984 WL
894, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 1984) (holding that eligibility rule requiring players to exhaust
college football eligibility before becoming eligible for USFL violated Sherman Act).
213. See Banks v. NCAA, 977 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1992); Gaines v. NCAA, 746 F. Supp.
738 (M.D. Tenn. 1990).
214. As part of the agreements between the professional leagues and the NCAA, the profes-
sional sports leagues impose these fines if a team approaches an undergraduate prior to the
draft. See SPERBER, supra note 22, at 212.
215. The Heisman Trophy is awarded to the nation's top college football player by the New
York Downtown Athletic Club. TELANDER, supra note 82, at 27. Naturally, a team with a
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might suffer lower attendance at its sporting events and canceled televi-
sion appearances.216 If large numbers of college athletes were to play for
only two or three years, athletic programs would be financially bur-
dened.217 The revenue generated by the programs would decrease, and
the athletic department would have trouble supporting itself. Money
thus motivates the NCAA's desire to maintain its draft restrictions with
professional basketball and football.218
These factors highlight the athletic department's desire to maximize
the athletes' production, and the NCAA's role in promoting this goal.
By restricting the movement of athletes and maximizing the athletes'
productivity, the NCAA has made its commercial motives its top
priority.
3. Curricular requirements of student-athletes
Another factor that reflects the NCAA's commercial motives is the
preferential treatment that universities give to student-athletes. The uni-
versities' preferential treatment begins before an athlete's acceptance into
the school219 and lasts throughout his or her stay at the university.220
This preferential treatment is reflected in the student-athletes' lowered
curricular requirements.
University acceptance rates for athletes indicate greater concern for
successful athletic programs than educational growth.221 This point is
underscored by statistics involving special admissions. 222 Most universi-
ties reserve a portion of an entering class for "special admissions." Gen-
erally, students who are accepted for special admission do not meet
normal entrance requirements, but have faced disadvantaged back-
legitimate Heisman Trophy candidate would tend to be much better than a team without such
a candidate.
216. SPERBER, supra note 22, at 213.
217. IcL A university would not have to lose large numbers of athletes to suffer a severe
burden. If a school consistently lost its top three or four athletes after only two or three years
of "production," the performance of its teams would drop, and its financial pressures would
increase.
218. Coaches and athletic directors try to justify this restriction by arguing that undergrad-
uates are not physically or mentally ready for the professional ranks. Id at 212. However,
many of the best professional players, such as the NBA's Michael Jordan and Magic Johnson,
left school early. Id
219. See generally LAPCHICK & SLAUGHTER, supra note 25, at 17-20 (describing problems
inherent in high school and college athletics).
220. See SPERBER, supra note 22, at 286-96.
221. See Sullivan, supra note 150, at 94; .4 Plan for Cleaning Up College Sports, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED, Sept. 30, 1985, at 36.
222. See A Plan for Cleaning Up College Sports, supra note 221, at 36.
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grounds or have latent academic promise.223 At some schools, sixty per-
cent of special admissions are athletes. 24
This skewed percentage of specially admitted athletes cannot be rec-
onciled with latent academic promise. In fact, once in college, student-
athletes' grade-point averages tend to be lower than those of other stu-
dents."2 The university's motivation for allowing such a disparate
number of student-athletes in through special admissions is consistent
with its economic goals: Many of the best high school athletes do not
meet the minimum entrance requirements to many universities.226 As a
result, if a school wants to field a top-notch team, it needs these athletes,
and the special.admissions program is the only way to get them.
A student-athlete's special treatment often continues throughout his
or her college career. Although athletes are required to meet minimum
unit requirements, there often are no requirements as to what specific
classes they must take.227 While these "hide-away curricula" keep the
athletes eligible, they do not ensure the student's progression towards a
degree.228 As a result, a great many student-athletes, many of whom can
223. Id at 35.
224. Id, Another indicator of this problem is the percentage of special admissions that
comprise a particular athletic team. For example, in 1989 over 85% of the University of
Washington's football and men's basketball recruits were special admits. Craig Smith, UW
Tops in "Special Admits"-85 Percent of Athletes Enter with Low Standards, SEATrLE TIMES,
May 20, 1991, at BI.
225. A Plan for Cleaning Up College Sports, supra note 221, at 35. A study by the Center
for the Study of Athletics at the American Institutes for Research revealed that the grade point
averages (GPA) of football and men's basketball players and other student-athletes tended to
be a half-grade lower than students involved in nonathletic extracurricular activities. Id. Stu-
dent-athletes in sports other than football and basketball tended to have a GPA a quarter-
grade lower than students in nonathletic extracurricular activities. Id. Not coincidentally,
football and men's basketball are the main revenue generators in an athletic program. See
SPERBER, supra note 22, at 30-35.
226. Again, many top high school athletes do not satisfy minimum entrance requirements
because they receive preferential treatment as early as junior high school. Admiring teachers
and principals often "help" star high school athletes by lowering their grading standards for
those individuals. Ivey, supra note 8, at 138.
227. For example, at Ohio University, students on the basketball team had International
Studies 369B, a four-credit course tied to the team's 14-day trip to Europe during the summer
of 1986. Ted Gup, Foull, TIME, Apr. 3, 1989, at 54.
228. See SPERBER, supra note 22, at 279-80. At the 1991 NCAA Convention, delegates
passed Proposal No. 81, which requires Division I institutions to define their own satisfactory
progress rules. Davis, supra note 8, at 600. However, Proposal No. 81 only requires satisfac-
tory progress to include successful completion of 50% of course requirements by student-
athletes in their respective majors before the beginning of their fourth year. Id. Thus, while
the proposal requires moderate progression towards a degree, an athlete can complete his ath-
letic eligibility and still may require another year or more of school to graduate. See SPERBER,
supra note 22, at 281. Additionally, many schools simply adjusted their academic curricula to
create majors with easy requirements. IdL at 283-84.
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barely read when entering college, never graduate.229 Even athletes who
are good students have trouble keeping up in school, given the demands
of unrealistic schedules imposed on student-athletes. 230 Further, many
universities with apparent high graduation rates among student-athletes
inflate their statistics.231  To create the illusion that student-athletes are
doing well academically, the NCAA excludes statistics of athletes who
dropped out or transferred in "good standing. ' 23 2 Because "bad aca-
demic standing" requires a grade-point average below D,23 many ath-
letes who dropped out with grade-point averages above a D-average after
using up their four years of eligibility are not included.2 3 4 Other schools
base their statistics regarding the graduation rates of student-athletes on
only those athletes who have made it to their senior year.2 35 Finally,
while overall graduation rates for student-athletes have increased, gradu-
ation rates for football and men's basketball have in fact decreased.
236
These manipulations mean that NCAA statistics do not accurately re-
flect actual academic progress and misrepresent the NCAA's success at
fulfilling its stated educational goals.237
This evidence supports the contention that the NCAA's goals are
commercial. If academic concerns were foremost to the NCAA, curricu-
lar requirements would be stricter and would ensure a constant progres-
sion towards a degree, instead of merely keeping an athlete eligible.2 38
Furthermore, if the NCAA were concerned with promoting education, it
229. For example, Memphis State University's men's basketball team graduated only four
players over a period of 10 years. Ivey, supra note 8, at 138. The NCAA annually publishes a
compilation of athletes' graduation rates, but withholds the names of individual institutions.
Gup, supra note 227, at 59. By publishing graduation rates in this manner, the NCAA can
hide schools such as Memphis State. See Ivey, supra note 8, at 138.
230. Athletes in major sports practice up to 30 hours a week. Gup, supra note 227, at 54.
Further, the student-athlete's total time commitment may be close to 80 hours per week during
the playing season. LAPCHICK & SLAUGHTER, supra note 25, at 116.
231. SPERBER, supra note 22, at 298.
232. Id. at 9.
233. A "D" average translates into a 1.00 grade point average on a 4.00 scale. See id.
234. Id. at 298.
235. Id at 9.
236. Sports Notebook, HOUSTON CHRON., Oct. 27, 1992, at 8 ("[G]raduation rates for stu-
dent-athletes in the two major revenue sports-football and men's basketball-were lower in
1986 than in either of the preceding two years."); Grading Graduates, USA TODAY, Aug. 13,
1992, at 8A ("Overall, the NCAA found, athletes in all college sports do almost as well gradu-
ating as non-athletes. But the devil is in the details. Among the top 25 schools in football in
1987, 22 had players who graduated at a rate below that of the student body.").
237. Id at 297-301.
238. By requiring progression towards a degree, by the time an athlete is a senior in college,
he or she should be close to graduating. The NCAA could also impose a minimum graduation
percentage for athletic teams, barring the team from post season tournaments or bowl games if
it failed to meet the percentage. Again, the sports with the lowest graduation rates are the
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would limit the number of student-athletes specially admitted, because
their performance in school has been below average.2 39 Limiting the
number of special admissions would also stimulate learning at the high
school level, because prospective college athletes would know that they
would not be specially admitted, and would have to meet the minimum
academic requirements of the university. As the NCAA's regulations
now stand, they are designed to keep athletes eligible, with a minimum
amount of time devoted to studies.2' With light academic schedules,
athletes can more fully devote their time to their sport.
4. The NCAA's enforcement process
Another practice that demonstrates the NCAA's commercial goals
is its efforts in enforcing its regulations. The problems with the NCAA's
enforcement procedures begin with the NCAA enforcement staff. The
enforcement staff itself is small-thirteen enforcement representatives are
responsible for policing hundreds of universities in the NCAA.241 Not
surprisingly, with such a small staff, the investigative process can be hap-
hazard. 42 For example, roughly half of the cited NCAA rule violations
in any given year are reported by the schools themselves.243 Addition-
ally, the NCAA does not want "aggressive, law-enforcement-type" of-
ficers on its enforcement staffi24
The NCAA's priorities do not include vigorous enforcement of its
regulations. If it were concerned about the corrupting influence of pro-
fessionalism in college athletics, it would be more vigilant in disciplining
schools that violate its rules. By becoming more vigilant, the NCAA
could ensure that economic influences would not dominate intercollegi-
ate athletics, and could better maintain the line between amateur and
professional athletics. As the situation currently stands, however, by not
heavily regulating the universities, the NCAA is, in effect, inviting
schools to violate its rules.245
A comparison of the NCAA's enforcement budget and its public
relations budget further reflects the NCAA's ambivalence. In 1990-1991,
sports that generate the most revenue-football and men's basketball. Sports Notebook, supra
note 236, at 8.
239. See supra note 236 and accompanying text.
240. See SPERBER, supra note 22, at 302-06.
241. Johnson, supra note 32, at 60.
242. See id. at 60-62.
243. Id at 62.
244. Idt at 61. The NCAA hired several former FBI agents in the mid-1980s, but they
were dismissed soon thereafter, because "they created more problems than they solved." Id.
245. See A Plan for Cleaning Up College Sports, supra note 221, at 36.
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the NCAA spent $3.4 million on public relations and only $2.2 million
on enforcement. 2' In 1991-1992, $2.5 million was allotted for promo-
tion and $2.3 million for enforcement. 247 While the gap between the two
has narrowed, public relations still takes priority over enforcement.
Again, this can be tied to the NCAA's commercial motive. By spending
more money on public relations than on its undersized enforcement staff,
the NCAA appears to be more concerned with increasing revenues than
with promoting education.248
Even when the NCAA enforces its regulations, its commercial mo-
tives are clear. For example, regulations governing similar activities in
different sports vary depending on which sport is involved. Baseball, a
non-revenue-producing college sport, has no restrictions on its profes-
sional draft.249 High school baseball stars can use agents and enter the
professional draft without losing their college eligibility.25° On the other
hand, because football and basketball are both revenue-producing college
sports, the NCAA has severe restrictions regarding application for these
drafts.251
This disparity in treatment also occurs within a particular sport.
For example, in 1990-1991, Robert Morris College was cited for making
illegal cash payments to a player. As a result, the NCAA banned Robert
Morris from participating in the NCAA Basketball Tournament and or-
dered the repayment of $88,145 it received from its 1989 tournament
appearance. 252 Because Robert Morris is not a big-time college basket-
ball name, its punishment was quick and final.253 Conversely, when the
University of Nevada, Las Vegas (UNLV) men's basketball program was
cited for thirty-eight NCAA violations-including the very same offense
for which Robert Morris had been sanctioned-it was allowed to choose
which year it would have to sit out the NCAA Tournament.254 Thus,
UNLV-the defending national champion-was, allowed to defer its
punishment for a year, and was given a chance to defend its title.255 Be-
246. Johnson, supra note 32, at 61.
247. Id.
248. See id. at 61-62.
249. SPERBER, supra note 22, at 214.
250. Id.
251. See supra notes 211-18 and accompanying text.
252. Johnson, supra note 32, at 62. It is also important to note.that the enforcement staff
did not discover the violation-Robert Morris reported the violation upon discovery of the
infraction. Id
253. Id. at 60.
254. Id at 62.
255. Ironically, UNLV lost to Duke University, Mike Penner, Duke Gets Its Revenge a
Year Later, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1991, at Cl, whose program is often cited as one of the
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cause UNLV is a big-time program and was ranked number one in Divi-
sion I men's basketball, and because the NCAA Tournament conceivably
would have lost revenue if UNLV were absent,25 6 the NCAA eased en-
forcement of its rules. Meanwhile, Robert Morris, which had honestly
reported its violation, was forced to accept its punishment as it was im-
posed by the NCAA.257
Again, the NCAA's profit-making motives are clear. If the NCAA
was truly concerned about the integrity of college athletics, it would
even-handedly apply its rules. Instead, its rules are relaxed or tightened
depending on the financial outcome of the decision.
C. Application of Antitrust Laws
If a student-athlete succeeded in showing that the NCAA's interests
are purely commercial, many NCAA regulations governing the eligibility
of the student-athlete would fail under antitrust scrutiny. In a section 1
suit, without the NCAA's educational rationale to fall back on, courts
would not apply relaxed scrutiny, and would find many regulations to be
per se invalid.255
Even if a court applies a rule-of-reason analysis, it would invariably
rule as the Supreme Court ruled in NCAA v. Board of Regents of the
University of Oklahoma.259 Under the rule-of-reason analysis, a court
would find that rules restricting athletic scholarships and benefits are ille-
gal price fixing. A court in this situation would use a rationale similar to
the court in Board of Regents: The NCAA's commercial activities have
a "direct and substantial anti-competitive effect on the marketplace" and
therefore violate antitrust laws.26
shining examples of how college athletics should work. Mark Blaudschun, Mike Krzyzewski
Has Developed Duke into the Class of College Basketball, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 3, 1992, at 55.
256. One of the primary reasons that the NCAA allowed UNLV to defer its punishment
was that it was concerned about a potential lawsuit by UNLV contesting its punishment.
NCAA Sought to Avoid Suit From UNLV, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Feb. 18, 1991, at IC.
Because the NCAA wanted to avoid any controversy surrounding the NCAA men's basketball
tournament, which might have detrimentally affected revenues, it deferred UNLV's punish-
ment. See id.
257. Robert Morris sued the NCAA, arguing that the NCAA's treatment of it was "arbi-
trary and capricious." Johnson, supra note 32, at 62. However, the school's complaint was
never resolved. See id
258. For example, regulations deemed to be price-fixing or group boycotts would be per se
invalid, because the NCAA would be operating as a commercial enterprise and could no
longer hide behind educational motives. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
259. 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
260. See id at 120.
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In section 2 suits, plaintiffs have had difficulty with the second
prong of the two-prong test.26' With the concept of amateurism elimi-
nated, however, the purpose of the NCAA is clear: By imposing its regu-
lations and restraining student-athletes, the NCAA willfully maintains
its monopoly power. Therefore, whether the relevant market is the mar-
ket for college athletes or the market for professional athletes, the
NCAA's regulations inhibit both movement and price. Thus, in a purely
commercial context, the NCAA's regulations exist solely to maintain the
NCAA's monopoly, and therefore violate section 2.
If an NCAA regulation is found to be in violation of antitrust laws,
the student-athlete would be able to recover either money damages, or he
or she would be able to get injunctive relief. Money damages, while diffi-
cult to calculate, might be the difference between what the student-ath-
lete receives now and what he or she would have received had there been
no restrictions on them. Injunctive relief would invalidate the regulation,
and would allow the student-athlete to sell his or her services to the high-
est bidder.
V. AVOIDING ANTITRUST VIOLATIONS
Because of the numerous problems with the present system, there
has been a loud cry for reform. Some critics of the NCAA have recom-
mended the establishment of a "minor league" for problem sports such
as football.262 Others have encouraged legislation that would further ac-
ademic goals.263 Practically, there are two possible plans for reform: one
involving academic reform, the other involving financial reform.
Although the academic plan would be more beneficial to student-ath-
letes, in reality the financial plan is more feasible.
261. See, eg., Gaines v. NCAA, 746 F. Supp. 738 (M.D. Tenn. 1990); Jones v. NCAA, 392
F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1975).
262. Telander, supra note 7, at 108.
263. Id. A bill, proposed by former NCAA and professional basketball player an.d current
New Jersey Senator Bill Bradley, would have required schools to reveal the graduation rates of
their athletes. H.R. 1454, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). While the NCAA voted for disclosing
graduation rates at its 1990 convention, some feel that it would not have done so if the bill had
not been pending in Congress. Ed Sherman, NCAA Hopes to Avoid Government "Intrusion",
CHICAGo TRIB., Aug. 4, 1991, at Cl; Telander, supra note 7, at 107. The bill was subse-
quently enacted into law, and requires that an institution's graduation statistics be provided to
prospective student-athletes prior to their signing letters of intent. 20 U.S.C. § 1092 (Supp. III
1991). For a discussion of six other bills relating to the NCAA and the student-athlete, see
David Williams, II, Is the Federal Government Suiting up to Play in the Reform Game?, 20
CAP. U. L. REv. 621 (1991).
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A. Academic Reform
The NCAA could avoid potential antitrust liability simply by en-
forcing its stated goals. If the NCAA and its members actually advo-
cated athletics as part of the educational experience, then the NCAA
would be shielded from antitrust liability, because it would act without a
purely commercial motive.2 4
To implement this solution, the NCAA and its members would have
to emphasize the "student" in student-athlete. 26 Emphasizing education
would not only involve requiring class attendance and the publication of
graduation rates, but would also emphasize the quality of the educational
experience. 21 6 Such a reform would allow athletes to at least partially
complete a quality education, and to more fully enjoy the college
experience.
1. Courses of study and academic programs
The emphasis on academics as well as athletics should begin prior to
an athlete's college career. The NCAA should impose a ceiling on the
percentage of special admissions given to student-athletes.267 Further-
more, all athletes should be required to attend an orientation session
prior to their freshman year.2 68 During this orientation, their educa-
tional needs should be evaluated, and educational assistance should be
either increased or decreased, depending on the need of the particular
athlete. Workshops could also be presented outlining study skills, read-
ing and writing skills, use of the library and basic computer skills.
269
Once the athlete has arrived at the campus, the school should con-
tinually make available academic support services. Academic support
would include supervision by faculty advisors and tutoring by fellow stu-
dents. The goal of the academic support service would be to help the
student-athlete adjust to the increased study load in college. A school
could also provide counseling to aid the student-athlete in balancing the
demands of the academic environment with the rigors of the athletic
environment.27 °
264. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
265. LAPCHICK & SLAUGHTER, supra note 25, at 204. While the NCAA has passed some
educational reforms, the student-athletes' educational interests are still inadequately protected.
Davis, supra note 8, at 599.
266. LAPCHICK & SLAUGHTER, supra note 25, at 204.
267. By imposing such a ceiling, a high school athlete could not "slide by." A ceiling would
also ensure that a majority of entering student-athletes had the ability to succeed in college.
268. Id
269. Id
270. Id
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In terms of the athlete's course of study, the school should closely
monitor the athlete's progress in order to ensure that the athlete is in fact
receiving a well-rounded education. Class attendance, as well as aca-
demic progress, should also be closely monitored by the school's aca-
demic advisors. If a particular student-athlete falls behind, additional
tutoring should be required. Course credits should be evaluated regu-
larly, and athletes should not be allowed to take classes solely for the
purpose of maintaining eligibility. Instead, the evaluations should be
made in terms of the athlete's interests and in terms of reasonable pro-
gress towards a degree.
Scholarship athletes should also be allowed to retain scholarships
for a period of time after their eligibility expires. 27 1 This gives the stu-
dent-athlete an opportunity to complete his or her education and earn a
degree, even if the athlete's eligibility has expired. Even former scholar-
ship athletes should be given some benefits if they choose to return to
school to complete their education. By guaranteeing athletes the oppor-
tunity to finish their educations, the NCAA would send a clear signal to
athletes that education is in fact its primary goal.
The NCAA should also impose graduation requirements on univer-
sities based on the number of entering freshman student-athletes. By us-
ing these statistics, the NCAA could accurately gauge the percentage of
graduating athletes. If a school fails to meet the requirements, it could
be suspended from post-season play. By raising its academic standards,
the NCAA would encourage the student-athlete to take academics
seriously.
2. Athletic scheduling policies
Of course, with greater emphasis on education, there must be less of
an emphasis on athletics. Changes in athletic policies should be designed
to deemphasize athletics and reemphasize academic achievement. For
example, freshman athletes should either be ineligible for competition or
have their playing time limited.272 Such a restriction would alleviate the
pressure on a freshman athlete, and allow the athlete to adjust to college
academic and social life.27 3
The NCAA would also have to take steps to balance the time spent
on athletics and the time spent on education.274 The first step toward
271. Id
272. Id at 205.
273. Id
274. For example, Professor Harry Edwards, a noted sociologist at the University of Cali-
fornia, Berkeley, evaluated Pac-10 athletic programs and estimated that scholarship football
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achieving this goal would be to restrict the number of games in a season.
For example, the NCAA could limit a season to ten games in football
and twenty-five in basketball, excluding tournament or bowl games.275
The NCAA could also restrict the number of hours an athlete could
practice. Further, it could limit the amount of travel required of the
athlete, for example setting a maximum number of class days an athlete
could miss due to travel. Finally, athletes should not be expected to skip
academic activities in order to participate in athletic activities. Instead,
the student should be able to participate in both equally.
Another step toward encouraging education would be to reduce the
effect of the "athletic subculture.12 76 Eliminating athletic dormitories
and athletic eating facilities and encouraging involvement in university-
wide social and academic activities would allow athletes to mingle with
the student body and more fully enjoy college life. However, because the
NCAA probably is not willing to make the sacrifices in revenue neces-
sary to implement any significant reform, its most plausible option in
avoiding antitrust liability is loosening its restrictions on athletes'
compensation.277
B. Financial Reform
While the ideal of the "student-athlete" is an admirable one, it is
impossible to achieve under the NCAA's current rules. The main pur-
players spend an average of 40 hours per week, year round, fulfilling their athletic scholarship
obligations. IL at 116. The time that students spent on football rose considerably during the
season, up to 80,hours per week when the team travelled. Id This is the equivalent of two
full-time jobs, and only the brightest and most diligent student-athlete is able to handle the
load. SPERBER, supra note 22, at 304.
275. Under NCAA Bylaw 17, the NCAA in 1991 passed Proposal No. 38, which reduces
the playing seasons for team sports from 26 weeks to 22 weeks. Davis, supra note 8, at 604.
However, the proposal excludes football and basketball. Id.
276. LAPCHIC & SLAUGHTER, supra note 25, at 207. This "athletic subculture" involves
the separation of the athletes from the rest of the student body. Typically, athletes live to-
gether in athletic dormitories and dine in separate eating facilities. Id. In effect, the athletes
are completely isolated, and, in this sense, they are a "subculture" within the university. See
id The NCAA is taking some steps to integrate the athletes; Proposal No. 30 from the 1991
NCAA Convention provides for the elimination of athletic dormitories by 1996. Davis, supra
note 8, at 601 n.26.
277. LAPCHICK & SLAUGHTER, supra note 25, at 81. Presently, athletes receive little more
than free tuition and some living expenses from their participation in college athletics. Id. at
73. Coaches, on the other hand, sign product endorsement contracts and receive six-figure
salaries, while the athletic departments reap the revenues from the athletes' participation. Id.
at 81. By giving student-athletes higher compensation, the NCAA might be able to avoid
antitrust litigation by an athlete who has become disenchanted with watching his or her school
reap the benefits of a successful college athletic program by using the student-athletes' labor.
See supra part IV.B.
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pose of big-time college athletics is to provide commercial entertain-
ment.278 If commercial entertainment remains the primary goal of
intercollegiate athletics, the NCAA and its members should acknowledge
that educational values no longer exist as a major factor in the business
world of big-time college athletics.279
1. Increasing expense money available to athletes
One possibility that would not dramatically change the present sys-
tem would be to simply increase the amount of expense money available
to athletes.280 While potential antitrust liability will still exist,28' by rec-
ognizing that student-athletes are not regular students and give them ad-
equate compensation, the NCAA will at least be giving the athlete what
he or she feels is deserved.2 82 By giving athletes money for expenses and
other incidentals, the status quo of the present system would not be up-
set.283 Additionally, increased payments would be "morally acceptable":
In terms of the concept of amateurism, the payments would merely rep-
resent a larger athletic scholarship.2 84 By giving athletes additional
spending money, the NCAA and its members would acknowledge that
participating in college athletics is essentially a full-time job, and that the
athletes should be compensated accordingly.
285
2. The International Olympic Committee plan
A more ambitious financial reform would be to adopt a plan similar
to that adopted by the International Olympic Committee (IOC). In
Olympic sport, the IOC's rules now permit athletes to accept living and
training grants, endorsement fees, and in some instances, prize money.286
The athletes can then put the money earned from athletic competition
into trust funds and use money from these funds to pay expenses.287 Af-
278. SPERBER, supra note 22, at 345.
279. Id
280. LAPCHICK & SLAUGHTER, supra note 25, at 81.
281. If the NCAA does not dramatically alter its rules, it will still be engaged in illegal price
fixing and group boycotts. See supra part III.
282. If the NCAA adequately compensates the student-athlete, he or she is less likely to
question the moral legitimacy of the NCAA. LAPCHICK & SLAUGHTER, supra note 25, at 82.
If the student athlete is satisfied with the compensation received, he or she will be less likely to
pursue antitrust litigation against the NCAA. See id
283. Id
284. Id
285. See SPERnER, supra note 22, at 348.
286. LAPCHICK & SLAUGHTER, supra note 25, at 82.
287. Id
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ter the athlete has completed his or her athletic career, the money from
the trust fund can be withdrawn.288
By adopting this system, the NCAA, like the IOC, would give the
athletes adequate consideration for the services they render to universi-
ties and the public.289 Furthermore, because the IOC has already
adopted such a plan, a similar NCAA plan would be considered within
the boundaries of "amateurism. '290 Such a system would acknowledge
the commercial nature of intercollegiate athletics, and recognize that stu-
dent-athletes are valuable contributors to its success. 291
VI. CONCLUSION
The present system under which the NCAA operates promotes the
pursuit of economic goals. In terms of academic goals, however, the sys-
tem is woefully inadequate. If the NCAA is truly serious about its stated
goals, it needs to take drastic steps to remedy the present situation. By
recognizing that the student-athlete cannot handle the rigors of both full-
time athletic and academic careers and by taking steps to ensure that
both careers can co-exist, the NCAA could conceivably achieve its stated
educational goals. Under such an academic reform, the NCAA would be
protected from antitrust laws because its educational goals would be
legitimate.
In light of the commercial success of big-time college athletics, how-
ever, true academic reform seems unlikely. If the NCAA and its mem-
bers refuse to protect the academic careers of student-athletes, it should
at least acknowledge the economic value of the student-athlete's partici-
pation and allow universities to compensate athletes accordingly. If it
fails to do so, it faces potential antitrust liability.
Regardless of which reform the NCAA chooses to implement, one
fact remains clear: The present system of intercollegiate athletics ex-
ploits the student-athlete, and the present system must be changed to
adequately protect the student-athletes' interests.
Christopher L. Chin*
288. Id.
289. Id
290. Id See supra notes 162-76 for a discussion of the relationship between the NCAA and
the Olympic ideal.
291. LAPCHICK & SLAUGHTER, supra note 25, at 82.
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